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FEDERAL OBSCENITY PROSECUTIONS: DIRTY
DEALING WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
INTRODUCTION
The first amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ."I The Courts have
consistently held that the right of free speech is not absolute
and have traditionally used a balancing approach in determin-
ing whether governmental action has unconstitutionally in-
fringed on this right.2 However, in Roth v. United States,3 the
Court rejected this approach as applied to obscenity prosecu-
tions and held that "obscenity is not within the area of consti-
tutionally protected speech or press."4 In a 1973 landmark deci-
sion, Miller v. California, 5 the Court reaffirmed the Roth hold-
ing that obscene material is not protected by the first amend-
ment and held that obscenity is to be defined by referring to
local community standards.'
Subsequently, in Hamling v. United States,7 the local
standards construction was applied to federal legislation,8
which makes criminal the mailing of obscene material. The
constitutionality of the Court's conclusion in Hamling, that
local standards apply in prosecutions for mailing obscene mat-
ter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, is the basic question with
which this comment will deal. Although there has been a flood
of legal commentary in the wake of Miller, two recent cases'
indicate that a closer analysis of the constitutionality of apply-
ing local standards to federal obscenity legislation is necessary.
In laying the ground work for the discussion of section
1461, this comment will initially examine the major doctrinal
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4. Id. at 485.
5. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
6. Id. at 37.
7. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
8. Federal legislation prohibits mailing obscene or crime-inciting matter, 18
U.S.C. § 1461 (1976); importation or transportation of obscene matters, id. § 1462;
mailing indecent matter on wrappers or envelopes, id. § 1463; broadcasting obscene
language, id. § 1464; and transportation of obscene matters for sale or distribution, id.
§ 1465.
9. United States v. Peraino, CR 75-91 (W.D. Tenn. May 6, 1976); Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
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developments that have characterized the Supreme Court's
treatment of obscenity issues. Following this examination, it
will investigate the history and construction of applicable fed-
eral legislation as they relate to the local standards definition
of Miller. Finally, it will demonstrate how the constitutional
infirmities in the local standards rule have been amplified by
recent federal obscenity prosecutions.
EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL OBSCENITY
STANDARD
Roth v. United States
It was not until 1957,10 in the landmark case of Roth v.
United States," that the Supreme Court established as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law a standard of obscenity applic-
able in both federal and state courts. In Roth the Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction of a defendant under a federal
statute2 prohibiting the mailing of obscene material. After con-
cluding that "obscenity is not within the area of constitution-
ally protected speech or press,"' 3 the Court fashioned a test for
measuring obscenity that rendered invalid any more stringent
standards: "whether to the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, the dominant theme of the ma-
terial taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."'"
Post-Roth Developments
Although it was feared that the Roth test would encourage
severe censorship, the Court used Roth for the next decade to
overturn convictions obtained in a number of obscenity prose-
10. The first legal standard for measuring obscenity was defined by the English
courts in Regina v. Hicklin, [18681 L.R. 3 Q.B. 359. The test adopted by the courts,
which came to be known as the Hicklin test, provided: "whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."
Id. at 369.
Although this test was subsequently adopted by many American courts, it was
rejected by later decisions. See, e.g., United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). Recognizing the potential broad application of the Hicklin test,
which allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon
particularly susceptible persons, the court in Ulysses held that "the proper test of
(determining] whether a given book is obscene is its dominant effect." Id. at 708.
11. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
13. 354 U.S. at 485.
14. Id. at 489.
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cutions.'5 During this ten year period, two significant cases
appeared on the Supreme Court docket: Smith v. California"
and Jacobellis v. Ohio. 7 In Smith, the court reasoned that a
conviction for possession of obscene material could not be sus-
tained against a bookstore operator absent proof that the oper-
ator had some knowledge of the character of the material. 8
Thus, the Court established that proof of scienter could not be
dispensed with in obscenity prosecutions, to avoid the danger
that distributors would self-censor in order to avoid possible
prosecution. 9 The Jacobellis Court, in a plurality opinion, an-
nounced that the appropriate community to be utilized when
measuring the "contemporary community standards" as de-
fined by Roth was a national one.2 ° Since the first amendment
is national in character, the Court reasoned that "the constitu-
tional status of an allegedly obscene work must be determined
on the basis of a national standard.' ' 1
Also in the decade after Roth, though breaking with its
pattern of overturning prosecutions, the Court decided three
additional cases which served to further define or modify the
Roth obscenity formula. These cases included: Mishkin v. New
15. See, e.g., Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
rev 'd, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir.
1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd,
355 U.S. 371 (1958).
16. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
17. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
18. 361 U.S. at 152-153.
19. The Court stated:
[Ilf the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents,
. ..he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected;
and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution
of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature .... "Every
bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of
the contents of every book in his shop. It would be altogether unreasona-
ble to demand so near an approach to omniscience."
361 U.S. at 153.
20. 378 U.S. at 195.
21. Id. Since only two members of the court participated in the majority opinion,
several jurisdictions held that Jacobellis was not dispositive of the community stan-
dards issue and therefore rejected the national standard rationale. See Jacobs v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 349 F. Supp. 605, 610 (S.D. Ind. 1972); In re Giannini, 69 Cal.2d
563, 577-80, 446 P.2d 535, 545-47, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 665-67 (1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 910 (1969); Hunt v. State, 475 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See also
Comment, The Geography of Obscenity's "Contemporary Community Standard," 8
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81 (1971).
Significantly, the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren expressed the view
that obscenity is to be defined by reference to "community standards" and not a
national standard. See generally O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court:
A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1964).
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York,22 Ginzburg v. United States, 3 and A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen-
eral of Mass. 4 In Mishkin, the Court affirmed the conviction
of the appellant and concluded that "[w]here the material is
designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly defined
deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large, the
prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest in sex of the members of that group." 5 In
Ginzburg, the Court also affirmed the conviction of the appel-
lant and perceived no threat to the first amendment guarantees
in stating that in "close cases" evidence of pandering may be
probative in determining the question of obscenity under fed-
eral constitutional standards."5 Ginzburg graphically demon-
strated the breadth of the term "obscenity" under the Roth
formula, indicating that the term encompassed not only the
content of the material, but also the manner in which it was
distributed.
In Memoirs, the final case in the trilogy, the Supreme
Court, in a plurality opinion, reversed a finding that the book
Fanny Hill was obscene and added an additional element to
the Roth formula, which made it considerably more difficult for
material to be characterized as obscene. Thus, the Court stated
that a book could be termed obscene only if the following ele-
ments are satisfied:
[1It must be established that (a) the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to
22. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
23. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
24. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
25. 383 U.S. at 508. The Court's holding was not foreclosed by the references in
Roth to the "average" or "normal" person. Since the Court's adjustment of the
prurient-appeal requirement demands that "the recipient group be defined with more
specificity than in terms of sexually immature persons, . . .the inadequacy of the
most susceptible-person facet of the Hicklin test [was avoided]." Id. at 509.
26. Evidence that the defendants engaged in the sordid business of pandering,
"purveying textual or graphic material openly advertised to appeal to the erotic
interest[s] of the defendants' customers," is relevant to the question of obscenity,
even though the material involved was not obscene in the abstract. Although the Court
rarely invoked the rationale of Ginzburg in subsequent obscenity prosecutions, in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court stated that the district court
had not erred in instructing the jury that evidence of pandering may be relevant, if it
found the question of whether the materials involved were obscene to be a close one.
Id. at 130.
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the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c)
the material is utterly without redeeming social value. 7
Until 1967, the law remained stable, as many cases involv-
ing obscenity convictions reached the Supreme Court. How-
ever, in Redrup v. New York, 8 decided in May, 1967, the Court
reversed the appellants' obscenity convictions and concluded
that publications not sold to minors, forced upon unwilling
individuals, or pandered were protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments from governmental suppression, whether
criminal or civil." This important obscenity decision was the
catalyst in subsequent years for a number of per curiam Su-
preme Court decisions which reversed numerous obscenity con-
victions, leaving many provocative books, magazines and films
constitutionally protected."
In 1969, the Court reached its zenith in affording constitu-
tional protection to sexually oriented material in Stanley v.
Georgia.3 1 In Stanley, the Court reversed the appellant's con-
viction for "private" possession of obscene material and held
that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making
mere private possession of obscene material a crime."32 How-
ever, the constitutional protections established by the Warren
Court for the distribution of obscene material, subject only to
27. 383 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added).
28. 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam).
29. Id. at 769, 770.
30. See, e.g., Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967);
Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Schackman v. California, 388 U.S.
454 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967); Books, Inc.
v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S.
448 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388
U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert v. New York, 388
U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967); Friedman v. New York, 388
U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967). For a complete list of the
Redrup per curiam decisions, see Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 n.8
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
32. Id. at 568. The Court stated:
But we think that mere categorization of these films as "obscene" is
insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Whatever may be
the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think
they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he
may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds.
Id. at 565.
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the limitation of safeguarding minors and unwilling recipients,
were subsequently eroded by the Burger Court in the years
following Redrup and Stanley.
Miller v. California
The first pivotal obscenity case decided by the Burger
Court concerned the issue of whether the distribution of ob-
scene materials to willing recipients who state they are adults
is constitutionally protected. In United States v. Reidel,33 after
concluding that Stanley neither questioned the validity of Roth
nor applied to the facts of the present case, the Court deter-
mined that an individual has no first amendment right to dis-
tribute or sell obscene materials, even though another individ-
ual has the right to receive and possess this material." As a
result of Reidel, the distribution of obscene material was
clearly placed outside the reach of the first amendment,
prompting one commentator to remark that "[aill hope of the
adult American public to be able to read and see what it
pleased was doomed."35
Inevitably, the stage was set for the case of Miller v.
California,3 which elaborated and refined, yet did not repu-
diate, the Roth test. The Court in Miller reformulated the
"standards which must be used to identify obscene material
33. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
34. The Court stated:
The District Court gave Stanley too wide a sweep. To extrapolate
from Stanley's right to have and pursue obscene material in the privacy
of his own home a First Amendment right in Reidel to sell it to him would
effectively scuttle Roth, the precise result that the Stanley opinion ab-
jured. Whatever the scope of the "right to receive" referred to in Stanley,
it is not so broad as to immunize the dealings in obscenity in which Reidel
engaged here . . . dealings that Roth held unprotected by the First
Amendment.
Id. at 355.
35. Fahringer & Brown, The Rise and Fall of Roth - A Critique of the Recent
Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions, 62 Ky. L. J. 731, 736 (1974).
For further discussion on the demise of Stanley, see United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Paris
Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Comment, Obscenity 1973: Remodeling the House that
Roth Built, 20 Loy. L. REV. 159 (1974); Comment, Obscenity: Federal Statutes Prohib-
iting Importation and Mail Distribution of Obscene Materials do not Violate First
Amendment, 25 VAND. L. REv. 196 (1972).
36. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller was one of five major obscenity cases decided by
the Court on June 21, 1973. The other obscenity decisions: United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Kaplan
v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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that a State may regulate without infringing on the First
Amendment as applicable to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment."37 The Court reaffirmed the Roth holding
that obscene material is not protected by the first amendment
and held that the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest (citation omit-
ted); (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a pat-
ently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value.38
Most importantly, the Court concluded that for purposes of the
element of "contemporary community standards" the relevant
community was a local and not a national one.3"
The Miller test for the determination of obscenity became
the leading standard in the obscenity area and was held applic-
able in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,4 ° which was decided on
the same day. In Paris the Court was presented with the issue
of whether the exhibition or display of obscene materials to
consenting adults in places of public accomodation could be
constitutionally prohibited.4 The Court reasoned that "the
37. 413 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 24. The "utterly without redeeming social value" test of Memoirs was
consequently rejected as a constitutional standard. Furthermore, the Court stated that
"no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct
specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed." Id. at 27.
39. Id. at 37. In United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) the
concept of "contemporary community standards" was first expressed by Judge
Learned Hand where he stated that "the word 'obscene' be allowed to indicate the
present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the
community may have arrived now." Id. at 121.
The trial judge in Miller instructed the jury that the relevant "community stan-
dards" in making the factual determination of obscenity were those of the State of
California. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's failure to instruct the
jury in the language of a "national standard" was not constitutional error. Although
the Court in Miller explicitly stated that national standards were not to be used in
state obscenity prosecutions, it failed to articulate and define the relevant community
standard that was to be used in subsequent obscenity prosecutions.
40. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
41. The trial judge dismissed the respondent's complaint on the theory that
obscene films are constitutionally immune from state regulation when exhibited to
consenting adults only with proper notice of their nature and reasonable protection
against exposure to minors. The Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed on
appeal and held that the films were obscene and their exhibition should have been
enjoined. Id. at 53.
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States have a legitimate interest in regulating commerce in
obscene material and in regulating exhibition of obscene mate-
rial in places of public accomodation." 2 Therefore, the state of
Georgia was not precluded from regulating the allegedly ob-
scene material exhibited in Paris Adult Theatre I or II, pro-
vided the applicable Georgia law met the first amendment
standards set forth in Miller. 3
Post-Miller Developments
After the June 21, 1973 obscenity decisions, the Court re-
manded a number of cases pending on appeal with directions
to apply the Miller standards. On remand a number of locali-
ties strictly applied the Miller test, resulting in a barrage of
obscenity prosecutions that attracted considerable criticism
from the press. The fear that the obscenity determination was
left to the unbridled discretion of local jurors was faced by the
Court in Jenkins v. Georgia." In Jenkins, the Court, after view-
ing the film "Carnal Knowledge," concluded that the film was
not obscene under the constitutional standards of Miller and
42. 413 U.S. at 69. The Court in Paris was unwilling to categorically state that
conduct involving consenting adults only is always beyond state regulation. Id. at 68-
69 (citation omitted).
43. The judgment was subsequently vacated and the case remanded to the Geor-
gia Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Miller. Id. at 70. Similarly, in Kaplan
v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973), United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S.
123 (1973), and United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973), which were decided the
same day, the Supreme Court remanded the cases to the courts below for further
proceedings not inconsistent with Miller. In Kaplan, the Court held that obscene
material in book form, i.e., expression by words alone, was not entitled to first amend-
ment protection. 413 U.S. at 118. In 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, the Court held that the
importation of obscene material, even though the material was for the importer's
private, personal use and possession, could be constitutionally prohibited (i.e., the
right to possess obscene material in the privacy of the home creates no right to import
it from another country). 413 U.S. at 128. In Orito, the Court held that federal regula-
tion of interstate transportation of obscene material was not constitutionally forbidden
merely because the transport was by private carriage or because the material was
intended for the private use of the transporter. 413 U.S. at 143.
For an excellent discussion of the common law governing obscenity prosecutions
from Roth to Miller, see Fahringer & Brown, supra note 35, at 732-40. See also Clor,
Obscenity and the First Amendment: Round Three, 7 Loy. L. A. L. REv. 207, 207-09
(1974); Hunsaker, The 1973 Obscenity-Pornography Decisions: Analysis, Impact, and
Legislative Alternatives, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 906 (1974); Comment, Obscenity: A
Step Forward By A Step Back?, 38 ALa. L. REV. 764 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A
Step Forward]; Comment, Miller v. California: A Cold Shower For The First
Amendment, 48 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 568 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cold Shower];
Comment, New Prosecutorial Techniques and Continued Judicial Vagueness: An Ar-
gument For Abandoning Obscenity As A Legal Concept, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 181
(1973) [hereinafter cited as New Prosecutorial Techniques].
44. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
that the defendant's conviction must be reversed, even though
a state court jury had determined the film to be obscene." After
Jenkins, it was theoretically possible that appellate courts, in-
cluding the United States Supreme Court, would be required
to continually engage in independent review of the constitu-
tional fact of obscenity, according no finality to the Miller for-
mulation."
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the Supreme
Court's treatment of obscenity issues has, since Roth, focused
on the definition of what is obscene. In attempting to refine this
focus, the Court has promulgated several tests to aid in the
obscenity determination. The most permissive of these tests
was propounded in Memoirs, which required that obscene ma-
terial must be utterly lacking in redeeming social value.
In Miller, the current controlling formula, the Court
moved away from the liberal Memoirs construction. Under
Miller, an obscene work must, among other things, simply lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. While the
more conservative Miller formula might potentially uphold
45. Id. at 155. The Court in Jenkins focused on the requirement of patent offen-
siveness, utilizing the examples given in Miller of what constitutionally meets the
"patently offensive" element: "representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated," and "representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U.S. at
25. After concluding that the film could not be found to depict sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way under the Miller standard, the Court stated:
While the subject matter of the picture is, in a broader sense, sex, and
there are scenes in which sexual conduct including "ultimate sexual acts"
is to be understood to be taking place, the camera does not focus on the
bodies of the actors at such times. There is no exhibition whatever of the
actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise, during these scenes. There are occa-
sional scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not enough to make material
legally obscene under the Miller standards.
418 U.S. at 161.
46. The Court's holding was buttressed by Miller, where the court stated that
"the First Amendment values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct
an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary." 413 U.S. at 25. The
Court in Jenkins concluded that "[elven though questions of appeal to the 'prurient
interest' or of patent offensiveness are 'essentially questions of fact,' it would be a
serious misreading of Miller to conclude that juries have unbridled discretion in deter-
mining what is 'patently offensive.' " 418 U.S. at 160. Justice Brennan, concurring,
observed that the court's decision would maintain the determination of obscenity on
a case-by-case basis, with the result that the obscenity of any material is not certain
"until at least five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have
pronounced it so." Id. at 164-65.
For a discussion concerning whether independent appellate review of findings of
prurient interest and patent offensiveness is actually possible in federal obscenity
prosecutions after Hamling, see notes 124-130 and accompanying text infra.
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more state obscenity prosecutions, the language of the Miller
opinion has posed constitutional problems for many state stat-
utes regulating obscenity.
In Miller, the Court stated that state obscenity statutes
must specifically define the types of sexual representation that
are to be regulated. 7 A number of courts applying these guide-
lines have struck down the state obscenity statutes as unconsti-
tutional.18 The applicability of this "specific definition" re-
quirement to federal obscenity statutes was left unanswered by
the Court in Miller."5 This was a critical question, since expan-
sive federal obscenity legislation provides a springboard for a
significant number of obscenity prosecutions.
FEDERAL OBSCENITY LEGISLATION
Mailing Obscene Matter
The power of Congress to regulate the channels of inter-
state commerce to the extent of forbidding the use of those
channels to promote or spread evil, immorality, or dishonesty
is a well-settled principle.50 The congressional motive and pur-
pose of a regulation that imposes conditions and requirements
on those who use the channels of interstate commerce is not
subject to constitutional restriction or judicial control.51 In
47. 413 U.S. at 23-24.
48. See, e.g., Birkenshaw v. Haley, 409 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Hamar
Theatres v. Cryan, 365 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1973); State v. Shreveport News Agency,
287 So. 2d 464 (La. Sup. Ct. 1973).
The majority of lower courts, however, have upheld unspecific state obscenity
statutes and ordinances by holding "that the word 'obscene' has independent judicial
meaning, and its mere use in a statute or ordinance is, therefore, susceptible of authori-
tative judicial construction conformable with the guidelines of Miller. " Birkenshaw v.
Haley, 409 F. Supp. 13, 20 (E.D. Mich. 1974). See, e.g., Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d
351 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1973); Redlich v. Capri Cinema, 43 App. Div. 2d 27, 349 N.Y.S.2d
697 (1973); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973);
Chobot v. Circuit Ct., 61 Wis.2d 354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973).
49. However, in United States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 418 U.S. 932 (1974), the court was faced with the question of whether 18 U.S.C.
§ 1462 (1976), which proscribes the interstate transportation of "obscene, lewd, lasci-
vious, or filthy" materials, could "satisfy the Miller requirement that the applicable
statute specifically define sexual conduct whose depiction or description is thereby
restricted." Id. at 1155. The court relied on United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973), where the Court stated it was "prepared to construe such
[federal statutory] terms as limiting regulated material to patently offensive repre-
sentations or descriptions of that specific 'hard-core' sexual conduct given as examples
in Miller," and therefore concluded that the federal statute met the Miller specificity
requirement by authoritative judicial construction.
50. See, e.g., North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946); Brooks v.
United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
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short, "[w]hatever their motive and purpose, regulations of
commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibi-
tion are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the
Commerce Clause. ' 52
The plenary power of Congress to prohibit the use of the
channels of interstate commerce to promote or spread evil or
immorality was extended to the regulation of obscene material.
Pursuant to the postal power granted in Article I, section 8,
clause 7, Congress enacted the obscenity statute currently codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1461.11 Section 1461, which generally makes
punishable the mailing of material that is obscene, lewd, lasci-
vious, filthy, or vile, is the focal point of this comment. In 1958,
section 1461 was amended" to bring it within the purview of
18 U.S.C. § 3237, which establishes the proper venue for offen-
ses involving the use of the mails. It is the interaction of section
52. Id. at 115.
53. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 768 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1461 (1976)). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, mat-
ter, thing, device, or substance;...
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in
the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the
mails, or delivery of anything declared by this section or section 3001(e)
of title 39 to be nonmailable, . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first such offense,
and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.
In 1865, Congress first enacted a law prohibiting the passage of obscene material
through the mails. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 89, § 16, 13 Stat. 507 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976). As originally enacted, the statute provided:
That no obscene book, pamphlet, picture, or other publication of a
vulgar and indecent character, shall be admitted into the mails of the
United States; any person or persons who shall deposit or cause to be
deposited, in any post-office or branch post-office of the United States,
for mailing or for delivery, an obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print or
other publication, knowing the same to be of a vulgar and indecent char-
acter, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, being duly con-
victed thereof, shall for every such offence be fined not more than five
hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, accord-
ing to the circumstances and aggravations of the offence.
This statute was subsequently revised, rewritten and expanded in later years. See Act
of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 148, 17 Stat. 302; Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat.
598; Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, 19 Stat 90.
For a detailed discussion of the history of § 1461, see generally F. SCHAUER, THE
LAW OF OBscENrrY 8-29 (1976); Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assump-
tion of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1009, 1010
& n.2, 1011 (1962); Paul, The Post-Office and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An His-
torical Note, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 44 (1961).
54. Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-796, § 1, 72 Stat. 962.
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1461 and section 3237 and the subsequent judicial interpreta-
tion of the impact of that interaction that has raised post-
Miller constitutional problems. As a result, it is important to
examine the judicial construction of section 1461, as amended.
Pre-1958 Judicial Interpretation and Construction
In Roth v. United States," the constitutionality of the fed-
eral obscenity statute, before its venue amendment, was at
issue. The Court in Roth considered the following constitu-
tional questions:
whether the federal obscenity statute violates the provision
of the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press ....
. . . whether these statutes violate due process, be-
cause too vague to support conviction for crime; whether
power to punish speech and press offensive to decency and
morality is in the States alone, so that the federal obscen-
ity statute violates the Ninth and Tenth Amendments."
The Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute and
held that "obscenity was not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press";57 that section 1461, "applied ac-
cording to the proper standard for judging obscenity, do[es]
not offend constitutional safeguards against convictions based
upon protected material, or fail to give men in acting adequate
notice of what is prohibited";" and "that the federal obscenity
statute punishing the use of the mails for obscene material is
a proper exercise of the postal power delegated to Congress by
Art. I, § 8, cl. 7V'51
55. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
56. Id. at 479, 480 (footnotes omitted).
57. Id. at 485.
58. Id. at 492. After considering the appellant's argument that the federal ob-
scenity statute violated the constitutional requirement of due process since it did not
provide reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt, the Court stated:
Many decisions have recognized that [the] terms of obscenity stat-
utes are not precise. This Court, however, has consistently held that lack
of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. ...
"[Tihe Constitution does not require impossible standards"; all that is
required is that the language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to
the proscribed content when measured by common understanding and
practices . United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8.
Id. at 491.
59. Id. at 493. The Court's holding that the federal obscenity statutes does not
unconstitutionally infringe upon rights reserved by the ninth and tenth amendments
to the states was buttressed by Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 506-08
(1904).
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1958 Venue Amendment
As originally enacted, section 1461 provided: "Whoever
knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery anything declared by
this section to be nonmailable. . . shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."60 In
1958, one year after Roth, section 1461 was amended by delet-
ing "deposits for mailing or delivery" and substituting "uses
the mails" so that the statute read: "Whoever knowingly uses
the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of
anything declared by this section to be nonmailable . . . shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years. . .. "' The 1958 amendment was intended to place the
venue for federal obscenity prosecutions within the purview of
18 U.S.C. § 3237, which provides in pertinent part:
Any offense involving the use of the mails, or transpor-
tation in interstate or foreign commerce, is a continuing
offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by en-
actment of Congress, may be inquired of and prosecuted
in any district from, through, or into which such commerce
or mail matter moves.62
As a result, mailing obscene matter in violation of section 1461
became a continuing offense and federal prosecutions could be
commenced in the district where the matter was mailed, the
district where the matter was received, or any district through
which the matter passed. The scope of permissible venue for
federal obscenity prosecutions was broadly expanded, and, as
will be shown, federal prosecutors became armed with a power-
ful and dangerous device to select the forum most favorable to
the government and chill the first amendment rights of the
distributor.
Post-1958 Judicial Interpretation and Construction
The constitutionality of section 1461 as amended by the
1958 venue provision was at issue in Reed Enterprises v.
60. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 768 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1461 (1976)).
61. Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. 85-796, § 1, 72 Stat. 962 (emphasis added).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1976) (emphasis added). The mailing of obscene material
thus became a continuing offense from the time of deposit to the time of delivery and
throughout transit. United States v. Ross, 205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953), which held
that the unlawful act proscribed in § 1461 was the "deposit for mailing and not a use
of the mails which may follow such deposit," was in effect overruled.
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Clark. 3 In Reed the plaintiffs contended that the 1958 venue
provisions:
constitute[d] a 'prior restraint' upon freedom of expres-
sion in violation of the First Amendment; deprive[d] per-
sons . . . of their liberty and property without due process
of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and ...
deprive[d] persons of their right to a fair trial in a crimi-
nal prosecution guaranteed by the provisions of the Sixth
Amendment. 4
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' contentions and con-
cluded that congressional power to designate proscribed offen-
ses, here the use of the mails for transporting obscene materi-
als, as continuing offenses does not violate the sixth amend-
ment venue provision of the Constitution 5 and the venue provi-
sion of section 1461 as amended in 1958 was constitutional."
Thus, after Reed it was constitutionally permissible for federal
prosecutors to forum shop and commence multiple criminal
prosecutions for mailing obscene material in districts through-
out the United States.
Roth and Reed, each of which upheld the constitutionality
of section 1461, were reaffirmed by a number of courts in subse-
quent obscenity prosecutions. 7 The federal obscenity statute,
if applied according to the proper standard for judging obscen-
ity,618 simply did not offend the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and due process. Subsequently, in Miller
v. California, the Court reformulated the proper standard for
63. Reed Enterprises v. Clark, 278 F. Supp. 372 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S.
457 (1968).
64. Id. at 375, 380.
65. Id. at 380. The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides: "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law . U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
66. Id. at 383. The Court initially recognized that first amendment rights, like
other individual rights are not absolute. Id. at 381. The Court then noted that since
the venue statute was applied only after obscene material had been mailed there was
no direct "prior restraint" upon free speech. Id. The Court then concluded that the
publishers' subjective fears of criminal prosecution, and pressures toward self-
censorship, which are implicit in any criminal statute, were not materially increased
by the multiple venue provisions, since the applicable obscenity standard was consti-
tutionally sufficient and uniformly applied. Id. at 382.
67. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); Miller v. United States, 431
F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Fragus, 422 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1970) (§ 1462
is constitutional); Miller v. Reddin, 293 F. Supp. 216 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
68. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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identifying obscene material." The "utterly without redeeming
social value test" of Memoirs was rejected and local com-
munity standards were adopted for determining whether mate-
rials were obscene as a matter of fact. Whether section 1461,
as a matter of constitutional law and federal statutory con-
struction, incorporated this new standard for defining obscene
material was left unanswered by Miller.
In Hamling v. United States,"0 decided one year after
Miller, the Court squarely faced the issue of whether the Con-
stitution requires the use of national standards in federal ob-
scenity prosecutions. The petitioners contended, paradoxi-
cally,7 that the standards in federal obscenity prosecutions
must be national in order to avoid serious constitutional ques-
tions. The Court rejected the petitioners' contention and
stated that "§ 1461 is not to be interpreted as requiring proof
of the uniform national standards which were criticized in
Miller.' 7 3 The Court then concluded that section 1461 incorpo-
rates the Miller standard of the average person applying local
community standards, in defining obscenity.7 4
69. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
70. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
71. The petitioners also contended that the trial court's instruction to the jury,
which embodied the principle of "national standards" for judging obscenity, was im-
proper under the standards laid down by Miller. Id. at 103.
72. Id. The petitioners relied on Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962), and United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1962), to support their
contention that a "national standard" must be applied. In Manual Enterprises, the
Court stated that the proper test for judging obscenity under § 1461 was a national
standard of decency. 370 U.S. at 488. In Palladino, the Court applied the statutory
construction used in Manual Enterprises, thereby promoting the uniform application
of federal legislation and avoiding the constitutional problems of due process and equal
protection. 490 F.2d at 502-03.
73. 418.U.S. at 105. The Court's conclusion was primarily based on a combined
analysis of Miller and Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Since Miller
rejected a uniform national standard of obscenity as hypothetical and unascertainable
and Paris reaffirmed the rule that expert testimony on behalf of the prosecution as to
the obscenity of the materials involved was not constitutionally required, the Court
concluded that § 1461 does not require proof of a national standard, and that "[a]
juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person in
the community or vicinage from which he comes for making the required [obscenity]
determination." 418 U.S. at 104-05.
The Court found further support for their conclusion in United States v. 12, 200-
Ft. Reels of Film, a case decided with Miller, where the Court stated: "We have today
arrived at standards for testing the constitutionality of state legislation regulating
obscenity. See Miller v. California, [413 U.S.] at 23-25. These standards are applica-
ble to federal legislation." 413 U.S. at 129-30.
74. 418 U.S. at 105. Since § 1461 was construed to incorporate the Miller obscen-
ity formula, the court in Hamling held that statute satisfied the specificity require-
ment of Miller. Id. at 114.
OBSCENITY PROSECUTIONS
After Hamling, jurors in federal obscenity prosecutions are
permitted "to draw on knowledge of the community or vicinage
from which they come in deciding what conclusion 'the average
person, applying contemporary community standards' would
reach in a given case."75 For example, the Court in Hamling
suggested that the jurors, in a case tried in the Southern Dis-
trict of California, would draw on the standards of that judicial
district. However, the Court was quick to add that the district
court would be free to admit evidence of standards existing in
areas beyond the limits of that judicial district if it perceived
that such evidence would assist the jury in making their deter-
mination."
Hamling has been reaffirmed by a number of courts in
subsequent prosecutions involving the mailing of obscene ma-
terial in violation of section 1461. 77 For example, in United
States v. Dachsteiner75 the Court stated that "contemporary
community standards must be applied as a matter of statutory
construction" in federal obscenity prosecutions.79 The district
court, however, was not required to define the geographical
limits of the community from which the jurors would draw
their knowledge. 8
The Court's latest pronouncement on the application of
local standards to federal obscenity legislation is Smith v.
United States.' In Smith, the Court was presented with the
issue "of the constitutional effect of state law, that leaves
unregulated the distribution of obscene material to adults, on
the determination of contemporary community standards in a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 for a mailing that is wholly
intrastate." '82 The Court reaffirmed Hamling and held that "a
state law regulating distribution of obscene material could not
75. Id. at 105.
76. Id. at 106.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. McManus, 535 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d
192 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Henson, 513 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Miller, 505 F.2d 1247
(9th Cir. 1974).
78. 518 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1975).
79. Id. at 21. See United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 433
F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), where the court stated that national standards
may not be applied, even when a federal statute is involved.
80. 518 F.2d at 22.
81. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
82. Id. at 293. Since § 1461 was enacted under Congress' postal power, the court
in Smith noted that the statute reached intrastate as well as interstate mailings. Id.
at 305.
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conclusively define contemporary community standards" in a
federal prosecution under section 1461, although such a law
could be introduced as evidence of the community standard."3
As a result, in federal obscenity prosecutions the issues of ap-
peal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness are to be
determined by the jury in light of their understanding of con-
temporary community standards, even though the state stat-
ute regulating the distribution of obscene material does not
proscribe dissemination of such material to adults.
The use of the local community standards test of Miller
and the continuing offense doctrine of section 3237 in federal
obscenity prosecutions is now firmly established. Federal
prosecutors, armed with these devices, are permitted to se-
lect the forum most favorable to the government. As a result,
defendants, particularly national distributors of potentially
"obscene" material, have claimed that they are subject to un-
necessary hardships and serious abuses. 4 As will be shown,
such hardships and abuses are extended to an unconstitutional
degree when section 1461, as amended by the 1958 venue provi-
sions, is construed as incorporating the Miller local community
standards formulation. In short, the application of local com-
munity standards and the venue provisions of section 3237 to
section 1461 yields a sum greater than the total of its parts and
provides federal prosecutors with a dangerous tool that seri-
ously threatens first amendment freedoms.
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IN THE APPLICATION OF LOCAL
COMMUNITY STANDARDS TO FEDERAL OBSCENITY PROSECUTIONS
Introduction
The application of local standards to federal obscenity
prosecutions mandated by Hamling arguably restricts the ac-
tivities of distributors of allegedly obscene materials to the
extent of interfering with constitutional freedoms. This section
of the comment begins with an analysis of the Court's holding
in Hamling, continues with an examination of the effects of the
local standards construction upon the constitutional freedoms
of distributors and the public, and concludes with a look at two
recent cases which illustrate the dangers inherent in the local
standards construction as practically applied.
83. Id. at 309. See also United States v. Danley, 523 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 929 (1976).
84. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944).
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Hamling v. United States
As noted earlier, the Court in Hamling clearly expressed
its opinion that the application of local community standards
to federal obscenity legislation was constitutional. 5 Despite the
Court's firm edict, the application of local standards to federal
obscenity prosecutions is arguably vulnerable to constitutional
attack.
Prior to Hamling, the proper construction of section 1461,
as amended in 1958, was that national standards in federal
obscenity prosecutions were constitutionally required in order
to avoid serious first amendment problems."8 Thus, in Manual
Enterprises v. Day,87 the Court, in a plurality opinion, declared
that the proper community standard for judging obscenity
"under the federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of
the United States whose population reflects many different
ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of de-
cency.""8 Furthermore, the Court stated that the 1958 venue
amendments to section 1461, permitting criminal prosecution
at the place of deposit, delivery, or intervening district, re-
vealed no congressional purpose to make the proper standard
for judging obscenity less than national. 9
In Jacobellis v. Ohio,9" the Court, also in a plurality opin-
85. The court stated:
[tihe fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be sub-
jected to varying community standards in the various federal judicial
districts into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal
statute unconstitutional because of the failure of application of uniform
national standards of obscenity.
418 U.S. at 106.
86. The legislative history of § 1461 gives not the slightest indication
that the application of local standards was contemplated. Indeed, the
remarks of an early sponsor of the provision indicate that application of
a national standard was intended:
"If there be a trial in this country or anywhere else of an obscene charac-
ter - of that character that a report of it would corrupt the morals of
the country generally - then I do not think the United States should
provide the means to circulate this kind of literature in whatever paper
or in whatever book it may be published." 4 Cong. Rec. 696 (1876) (re-
marks of Rep. Cannon) (emphasis added).
Id. at 143 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
88. Id. at 488.
89. Id. at 488 n.10. Justice Harlan noted that the adoption of a local standard
for judging obscenity may have "the intolerable consequence of denying some sections
of the country access to material, there deemed acceptable, which in others might be
considered offensive to prevailing community standards of decency." Id. at 488.
90. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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ion, extended the rationale of Manual Enterprises to local ob-
scenity prosecutions and held that the "constitutional status of
an allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of
a national standard."'" The Court stated that the application
of a local standard would result in restricting the public's ac-
cess to materials "which the State could not constitutionally
suppress directly.""2 The Court reasoned that the dissemina-
tion of a film or book to localities where it might be held not
obscene would be significantly deterred if the film or book had
been previously suppressed by the conservative standards of a
different locality. Rather than risk additional criminal convic-
tions, a national distributor would be induced to practice a
form of indirect self-censorship."
The construction of section 1461 established by Manual
Enterprises and recognized by Jacobellis was subsequently
overruled in Hamling, where the Court held that local com-
munity standards apply in federal obscenity prosecutions. The
Court's rejection of the view that national standards must be
applied in federal obscenity prosecutions was based largely on
their interpretation of United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Film,"4 a case decided with Miller. Since 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Film established that the standards for testing the constitu-
tionality of state legislation regulating obscenity announced in
Miller are applicable to federal legislation, 5 the Court in
Hamling held that section 1461 incorporates the average per-
son, applying the local community standards test."
91. Id. at 195. The Court found support for their interpretation of "contemporary
community standards" in United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913),
where Judge Learned Hand recognized that the concept would vary temporally but not
geographically. See Comment, The Scope of Supreme Court Review in Obscenity
Cases, 1965 DUKE L.J. 596, 598-99.
92. 378 U.S. at 194 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
93. Id.
94. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
95. See note 73 supra.
96. The Court's holding in Hamling, however, can be criticized since the Court's
application of 12 200-Ft. Reels was arguably beyond the scope of that case. Although
the Court in 12 200-Ft. Reels stated that the obscenity standards announced in Miller
were applicable to federal legislation, the Court there refrained from applying local
community standards to federal legislation. The Court's textual reference to Miller
concerning the standards applicable to federal legislation "cited the pages of Miller
describing the elements of obscenity, appeal to prurient interest, portray sex in pat-
ently offensive way, lack of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, not
the pages discussing community standards." United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499,
502 & n.8 (1st Cir. 1974). Thus, under 12 200-Ft. Reels, the Miller standards were
applicable to federal legislation only for the limited purpose of properly construing the
words "obscene," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy," "indecent," and "immoral" that are
used to describe material subject to regulation. See 413 U.S. at 130 n.7.
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Difficulties Inherent in Local Standards
The Hamling Court's extension of local standards to fed-
eral obscenity prosecutions not only lacks firm constitutional
underpinning but it fails to take into account some basic reali-
ties inherent in federal obscenity prosecutions. The rights of
the diverse local communities throughout the nation to protect
their moral fiber does not justify the use of a varying local
standard in federal obscenity prosecutions. Although the rights
of the local communities to regulate obscene material and pro-
tect the general welfare may outweigh the rights of individuals
to express themselves freely as guaranteed by the first and
fourteenth amendments in local obscenity prosecutions, 7 it is
an entirely different matter when these rights are asserted to
exist in federal obscenity prosecutions. 8 Since the federal stat-
ute proscribing the mailing of obscene matter incorporates the
Miller standard for defining obscenity, an essential element of
such a crime is whether the material appeals to the prurient
interest of the average person applying local community
standards." By requiring the use of local standards in federal
obscenity prosecutions the Court is, in effect, altering an ele-
ment of the crime of mailing obscene matter and permitting
juries within the ninety-four federal districts to reach different
results when judging identical material.' °° This modification
raises serious issues under the equal protection clause of the
federal Constitution, which demands that the elements of a
crime be consistently applied throughout the nation.'0 '
A simple hypothetical illustrates the pitfalls of the Court's
construction. Suppose that two Los Angeles distributors send
identical allegedly obscene material to Memphis, Tennessee.
Under the venue provisions of section 1461, the government
could prosecute one distributor in Los Angeles and the other
distributor in Memphis. Arguably, the distributor prosecuted
in Memphis could be convicted while the distributor prose-
cuted in Los Angeles could be acquitted, depending on which
97. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13, (1973).
98. See note 105 infra.
99. See Fahringer & Brown, supra note 35, at 749 n.76; Schauer, Obscenity and
the Conflict of Laws, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 377, 396 n.86 (1975), where the author states
that the applicable community standard "is a substantive element of the offense
because virtually all obscenity statutes prohibit the transportation, distribution, or
mailing of obscene material only, and according to Roth and Miller, matter is not
obscene unless it offends some community's standards."
100. See Fahringer & Brown, supra note 35, at 749 n.76.
101. See id. at 749; Hunsaker, supra note 43, at 952-53.
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district has the more conservative obscenity standard. Even
though jurors in Los Angeles and Memphis could conceivably
reach a different result if a national standard were applied, this
would be due to the variable and diverse nature of the jury
rather than a modification of an element of the crime, which
is constitutionally inform. 102 Therefore, in a prosecution for
mailing obscene matter in violation of section 1461, "a national
standard is constitutionally necessary for consistent applica-
tion of each of the criminal elements of the offense.'
103
The Court in Hamling disposed of the contention that the
application of local standards to federal obscenity prosecutions
was constitutionally infirm by stating that since "distributors
may be subjected to . . . varying degrees of criminal liability
in prosecutions by the States for violations of state obscenity
statutes, . . . there is no constitutional impediment to a simi-
lar rule for federal prosecutions."''04
The Court failed, however, to recognize that the threat of
prosecution for violation of state obscenity statutes has an en-
tirely different effect on the national distributor than the
threat of prosecution for violation of federal obscenity stat-
utes.' 5 Although a national distributor may be restrained by
the threat of conservative local standards in state obscenity
prosecutions,' 6 "the power of the state to prosecute crimes that
are essentially extraterritorial" is constitutionally limited.107
Under the venue amendment to the federal obscenity statute,
the national distributor can be prosecuted in practically any
district throughout the United States.' 8 As a result, federal
prosecutors are able to continually commence criminal obscen-
ity actions in the district with the most conservative obscenity
102. See Fahringer & Brown, supra note 35, at 749 n.76.
103. Id.
104. 418 U.S. at 106.
105. The Court in Hamling also failed to recognize that "a federal statute defin-
ing a criminal offense should prescribe a uniform standard applicable throughout the
country." Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 312 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see notes 87-89 and accompanying text supra. Mr. Justice Harlan consistently distin-
guished between federal and state regulation of obscenity and stated that "the States
are constitutionally permitted greater latitude in determining what is bannable on the
scope of obscenity than is so with the Federal government." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (dissenting opinion). When the power of the federal government
must be balanced against the limitations of the first amendment, the application of a
uniform standard becomes more apparent. See id. at 194-95.
106. See text accompanying notes 92-93, supra.
107. Schauer, supra note 99, at 389; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (West
Supp. 1978).
108. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
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standard.109 National distributors are then no longer subject to
the varying obscenity standards of the local communities, but
rather are subject to one conservative standard which has, in
effect, been established on a national level."10 In short, the con-
servative local standard which has been superimposed on the
nation as a whole in federal obscenity prosecutions more se-
verely restrains the distributors' exercise of first amendment
rights and more severely deprives the public access to pub-
lished materials than does the use of a conservative local stan-
dard in state obscenity prosecutions.
Finally, the Court in Hamling relied on the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis, which was
cited with approval in Miller, to dispose of the constitutional
objections to the application of local standards to federal ob-
scenity prosecutions. In Jacobellis, Mr. Chief Justice Warren
stated:
[W]hen the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to be
defined by reference to "community standards," it meant
community standards - not a national standard, as is
sometimes argued. I believe that there is no provable
"national standard," and perhaps there should be none. At
all events, this Court has not been able to enunciate one,
and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to
divine one."'
Since it would seemingly be futile to require the jury to make
the obscenity determination on the basis of "hypothetical" and
"unascertainable" national standards, the Court in Hamling
concluded that section 1461 was not rendered unconstitutional
because of the failure to apply a uniform national standard of
obscenity in federal prosecutions."'
Although theoretically a national standard could be a
"many headed hydra, only ingenuously to be spoken of as
within the competence of any expert short of Hercules,""11 3 the
109. This is especially true when federal prosecutors combine a charge of viola-
tion of the federal obscenity statute with a charge of conspiracy to violate that statute.
110. See Recent Decisions: Constitutional Law-Obscenity, 40 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 442, 449 (1973).
111. 378 U.S. at 200.
112. Although "the adversary system ... has historically permitted triers of fact
to draw on the standards of their community," Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 30,
the application of local standards to federal obscenity prosecutions cannot be justified
when constitutional rights are transgressed.
113. United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499, 504 (1st Cir. 1962) (Aldrich, J.,
dissenting).
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Court in Hamling failed to perceive that the same difficulty
inheres in a local standard."' Under the Court's formulation,
jurors in a federal obscenity case tried in the Central District
of California are permitted to draw on their knowledge of the
standards of that judicial district."' Arguably, this judicial dis-
trict, like a nation composed of many states, is too large and
diverse to permit a reasonable articulation of an obscenity
standard for the entire district."' As a result, jurors under the
Hamling formulation are compelled to apply a local standard
that is nearly as abstract, hypothetical, and unascertainable as
a national standard.
First Amendment Problems Posed by Hamling
The Court's approval of local community standards as
applied in Hamling also raises serious first amendment prob-
114. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977), where Mr. Justice Stevens
stated that:
[tihe conclusion that a uniformly administered national standard
is incapable of definition or administration is an insufficient reason for
authorizing the federal courts to engage in ad hoc adjudication of crimi-
nal cases ....
The most significant reasons for the failure to define a national stan-
dard for obscenity apply with equal force to the use of local standards.
Even the most articulate craftsman finds it easier to rely on subjective
reaction rather than concrete descriptive criteria as a primary defini-
tional source.. . . The diversity within the Nation which makes a single
standard of offensiveness impossible to identify is also present within
each of the so-called local communities in which litigation of this kind is
prosecuted. . . . For surely, the standard for a metropolitan area is just
as "hypothetical and unascertainable" as any national standard. For a
juror, it would be almost as hard to determine the community standard
for any large urban area as it would be to determine a national standard.
Metropolitan areas typically contain some commercial districts devoted
to the exploitation of sex, in bookshops, adult theaters, night-clubs, or
burlesque houses; a juror might have seen respectable citizens frequent-
ing the entertainments of such areas and therefore conclude that the
community standard was one of "anything goes." Another juror might
predicate his standard on residential enclaves which include nothing even
closely resembling an adult bookstore, and decide that such an area re-
flects the proper standard. Under that test, the juror would probably
conclude that any magazine sold from under the local drugstore counter
must be obscene because its presence on the magazine rack might offend
customers. A third juror might try to apply a hybrid standard.
Id. at 313, 314 & n.10. See Comment, Obscenity: Determined by Whose Standards?,
26 U. FLA. L. REv. 324, 328 (1974).
115. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra; United States v. Dachsteiner, 518
F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975).
116. See United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499, 504 (1st Cir. 1974) (Aldrich,
J., dissenting).
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lems.117 As outlined previously, federal obscenity prosecutions
under section 1461, with its accompanying venue provision, are
permissible in any district in which the obscene material has
been mailed or received or in any district through which the
obscene material has passed."' When the availability of forum
shopping is viewed in conjunction with the Court's local stan-
dards construction, it becomes readily apparent that "the guilt
or innocence of distributors of identical materials mailed from
the same locale can . . . turn on the chancy course of transit
or place of delivery of the materials.""' 9
As a result, national distributors of potentially obscene
material must not only attempt to discern the virtually unas-
certainable community standards of every locality into which
the material may wander, but are also faced with the risk,
expense, and hardship of prosecution in remote districts.
Under this combination of factors, national distributors must
inevitably be unconstitutionally restrained in the exercise of
their first amendment rights.2"
117. Many commentators have suggested that serious first amendment issues are
raised by applying local standards to federal obscenity legislation. See, e.g., Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 142-45 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Clor, supra note
43, at 216; Fahringer & Brown, supra note 35, at 749 n.76; Schauer, supra note 99, at
395-96; Cold Shower, supra note 43, at 593, 597; Comment, Venue: Its Impact on
Obscenity, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 363, 371-72 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Venue];
Comment, Multi-Venue and the Obscenity Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 432, 437
(1967).
118. Although the continuing offense doctrine permits prosecutions in any dis-
trict through which the obscene material has passed, federal prosecutors have been
disinclined to bring actions in these districts. Arguably, prosecutions brought in these
intermediate districts raise "substantial constitutional considerations" in regard to
appropriate venue. See Schauer, supra note 99, at 392.
119. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. For a thorough discussion of the concept of "chilling effect," see Note, The
Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969); Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970).
In answer to the argument that the application of local standards to obscenity
prosecutions would have a chilling effect on the dissemination of constitutionally pro-
tected materials, the Court in Miller stated that:
[Tihe use of national standards . ..necessarily implies that materials
found tolerable in some places, but not under the "national" criteria, will
nevertheless be unavailable where they are acceptable. Thus, in terms of
danger to free expression, the potential for suppression seems at least as
great in the application of a single nationwide standard as in allowing
distribution in accordance with local tastes . ...
413 U.S. at 32 n.13. However, many commentators have attacked the Court's response
as "weak" and "merely negative in character." See Hunsaker, supra note 43, at 926;
40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 442, 449 (1973); 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 324, 328 (1974). "It is not
enough for the court to say only that local standards are no worse than national
standards when the difference in application of standards could produce altered effects
on fundamental first amendment freedoms." Id. at 328.
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The plight of the national distributor is further com-
pounded by the fact that the prosecution is not constitutionally
required to introduce expert testimony as to obscenity if the
alleged.obscene material has been placed into evidence.'21 Fur-
thermore, even if such expert testimony is produced (e.g., by
the defense), the trier of fact is not bound to give any weight
to such evidence in making the obscenity determination.' As
a result, national distributors are faced with the implicit threat
that the obscenity judgment may be the result of the subjective
moral outlook and personal upbringing of local jurors, who are
largely insensitive to the basic values of freedom of expres-
sion."'
The chilling effect caused by the myriad of local standards
and the exclusion of expert testimony cannot be obviated by
the safeguard of independent appellate review, which is essen-
tial to the "preservation of freedom of expression."' 24 Although
the serious value element of the Miller obscenity formulation
is presumably determined on the basis of a national stan-
dard,'25 the prurient interest and patent offensiveness factors
are determined by applying local community standards. These
standards present serious obstacles to meaningful appellate
review in federal obscenity prosecutions due to the ambivalent
121. Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973); see Kaplan v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1973).
122. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100 (1974); Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
123. See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Consti-
tutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 119 (1960).
One commentator has stated that:
[the consequences of the Paris decision could be shattering. Failure
to provide any proof on the essential elements of obscenity is an open
invitation for jurors to confuse personal distaste with prurient appeal. It
also encourages jurors to become puritanical and to suppress materials
without any objective basis . . ..The elimination of the need for any
proof on the issue of obscenity (except the publication itself) is bound to
launch juries on a rampage of legal sorcery that, in the words of Klaw,
may put the Salem witch trials to shame.
Fahringer & Brown, supra note 35, at 747. Similarly, the Court in United States v.
Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 1965), stated that unless proper proof was Adduced,
"it would be altogether too easy for any prosecutor to stand before a jury, display the
exhibits involved, and merely ask in summation: 'Would you want your son or daugh-
ter to see or read this stuff?' A conviction in every instance would be virtually assured."
124. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 123, at 119.
125. Although the court in Miller did not explicitly state that the serious value
element of the obscenity formulation was to be determined by applying national stan-
dards, most commentators have so held. See, e.g., Lockhart, Escape From The Chill
of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REv. 533, 552-55
(1975).
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nature of the relevant community. In Hamling, the court
stated that jurors are permitted "to draw on knowledge of the
community or vicinage from which they come,"'' 6 yet a district
court is free to admit evidence of standards existing in areas
beyond the limits of that particular judicial district if it per-
ceives that such evidence would assist the jury.'1 As a result,
the appellate courts may be ignorant of the specific community
whose standards were applied since no particular geographic
community need be specified by the district court, and, if a
particular community was so specified, the jurors are "free to
apply their own conceptions of community mores."' 28 For an
appellate court, which on the one hand is unable to ascertain
the specific community standard and on the other hand is un-
able to compare the jury's findings with the weight of the evi-
dence, 29 direct review of findings of prurient interest and pat-
ent offensiveness becomes exceedingly difficult. '3 1
The power to select venue and apply local standards in
criminal obscenity prosecutions not only induces national dis-
tributors to engage in self-censorship but also abridges the first
amendment rights of the public at large, by restricting their
access to published and possibly protected material. As Justice
Brennan noted in his Hamling dissent, the application of local
standards to federal obscenity prosecutions and the resulting
self-censorship "'would tend to restrict the public's access to
forms of sexually oriented materials which the United States
could not constitutionally suppress directly .. .a censorship
.. .hardly less virulent for being privately administered, for
through it, the distribution of all sexually oriented materials,
both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded.' ,,13 There-
fore, in many localities the public will be "protected" from
sexually oriented materials to which the government could not
otherwise constitutionally deny them access.
126. 418 U.S. at 105.
127. Id. at 106.
128. Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller
v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1844 (1975).
129. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
130. Note, supra note 128, at 1843-44. For further discussion on the viability of
independent appellate review, see comment, Jenkins v. Georgia and Hamling v.
United States: Testing the Miller Obscenity Test, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 349,
353-54 (1975).
131. 418 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Vagueness Problems Posed by Hamling
The Supreme Court has traditionally "taken special care
to insist on fair warning when a statute regulates expression
and implicates First Amendment values."'32 Therefore, indi-
viduals have a right to notice of that conduct which is pro-
scribed before criminal proceedings can be commenced. Many
commentators have suggested that statutes which proscribe
the mailing or distribution of obscene material fail "to provide
adequate notice of the types of materials that are prohibited"'33
due to the vagueness of the obscenity concept as defined by
Miller. 34 As a result, distributors have been induced to engage
in self-censorship by suppressing the distribution of protected
as well as unprotected materials.'35
The dangers of an inherently vague obscenity concept to
the right of free speech are exacerbated when undefined local
community standards are applied in making the obscenity de-
termination. Since local community standards form an integral
part of the obscenity definition in prosecutions under the fed-
eral statutes, it becomes imperative for the distributor to know
the boundaries of the relevant community.
However, as has previously been noted,3 ' the relevant
community for federal obscenity prosecutions is largely unde-
fined, making the distributor's task of determining the confines
of the appropriate community virtually impossible. When this
relevant community problem is viewed in conjunction with the
well-grounded fears that the obscenity determination may be
132. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977); see United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), where the court stated:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a crimi-
nal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underly-
ing principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for con-
duct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.
Id. at 617.
133. Comment, Obscenity 1973, supra note 35, at 174.
134. See, e.g., New Prosecutorial Techniques, supra note 43, at 198-200; Lock-
hart, supra note 125.
135. See Lockhart, supra note 125, at 559, where the author states:
The vague standard suffices to make those who deal in material that
"may" be covered aware that they "may" be prosecuted, but it fails to
provide adequate means for determining in advance of final adjudication,
even with advice of counsel, which materials are subject to the law and
which ones are constitutionally protected, thereby discouraging the dis-
tribution of all material that might possibly be unprotected - including
constitutionally protected materials.
136. See text accompanying notes 126-28 supra.
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made according to the subjective and personal outlook of the
jury,'37 it is evident that a distributor involved in a federal
obscenity prosecution has no notice of that conduct which is
proscribed and the statute, therefore, seems impermissibly
vague.' 38 Additionally, the vagueness argument clearly sup-
ports the proposition that the statute has a chilling effect on
the distribution of protected material.
An examination of the Court's opinion in Hamling thus
reveals that the application of local standards to federal ob-
scenity prosecutions theoretically has paved the way for abu-
sive prosecutorial forum shopping, definitional inconsistency in
the elements of a federal statute, adverse chilling of first
amendment freedoms, and legitimation of an unconstitu-
tionally vague statute. Unfortunately, the theoretical difficul-
tues presented by Hamling have emerged and withstood chal-
lenge in two recent federal obscenity prosecutions.
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF HAMLING: EMERGENCE OF THE
DANGERS INHERENT IN THE LOCAL STANDARDS CONSTRUCTION
Smith v. United States
In Smith v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that a state law which left unregulated the
distribution of obscene material to adults could not conclu-
sively define contemporary community standards in a federal
obscenity prosecution under section 1461.'13 In reaching this
conclusion, Smith has compounded the constitutional infirmi-
ties inherent in Hamling's application of local standards to
federal obscenity legislation.
In Smith, a distributor mailed various materials totally
within the state of Iowa, where the dissemination of obscene
materials to adults was not made criminal or even proscribed
by the applicable state regulations. "' Although the distributor
had not violated any state laws, he was indicted under section
137. See notes 121-30 and accompanying text supra.
138. See generally Lockhart, supra note 125, at 552; Comment, Miller v. Califor-
nia: A Search for a New Community, 5 U.W.L.A. L. REv. 63, 65, 67 (1973).
139. 431 U.S. at 309 (Powell, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 293-96. The Iowa obscenity legislation, effective July 1, 1974, and
applicable to petitioner, "made it a 'public offense' to disseminate obscene material
to minors (defined as persons 'under the age of eighteen')." Id. at 294. In 1976, the Iowa
legislature enacted a new code, which generally revised the state's "substantive crimi-
nal laws." The new law, effective January 1, 1978, regulates to a limited extent,
conduct aimed at adults. Id. at 295.
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1461 for mailing obscene materials.' The jurors, who were in-
structed to draw on their own knowledge of the views of the
average person in the community and to consider the state law
as evidence of the community standard, found the distributor
guilty.' The Supreme Court affirmed the distributor's convic-
tion and held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague
as so applied.'
Flowing directly from the Court's decision in Hamling,
Smith draws an ominous conclusion for the distributors of al-
legedly obscene materials: a distributor can no longer rely on
state regulation as an accurate reflection of the community
standard.' Thus, Smith not only ignores the vagueness prob-
lem inherent in the "local standard" but also eliminates state
regulations as a conclusive source for determining what con-
duct is proscribed. In the end, a distributor faced with an unde-
finable community standard may feel forced to forego the exer-
cise of his constitutional right to publish, or circulate possibly
protected material.
Some commentators have suggested that "[t]he protec-
tion of first amendment rights will be greatly enhanced by
interpreting community standards to mean state-wide stan-
141. 431 U.S. at 296.
142. Id. at 297-98.
143. Id. at 309.
144. In Smith, the district court observed that "Iowa's decision not to regulate
distribution of obscene material did not mean that the people of Iowa necessarily
'approve[d] of the permitted conduct' . . . whether they did was a question of fact
for the jury." Id. at 298. In addition, the Supreme Court stated that:
the significance of Iowa's decision in 1974 not to regulate the distribution
of obscene materials to adults is open to question. Iowa may have decided
that the resources of its prosecutors' offices should be devoted to matters
deemed to have greater priority than the enforcement of obscenity stat-
utes. Such a decision would not mean that Iowa affirmatively desired free
distribution of those materials; on the contrary, it would be consistent
with a hope or expectation on the State's part that the Federal Govern-
ment's prosecutions under statutes such as § 1461 would be sufficient for
the State's purposes. The State might also view distribution over the
counter as different from distribution through the mails. It might con-
clude that it is easier to keep obscene materials out of the hands of minors
and unconsenting adults in retail establishments than it is when a letter
or package arrives at a private residence. Furthermore, the history of the
Iowa law suggests that the State may have left distribution to consenting
adults unregulated simply because it was not then able to arrive at a
compromise statute for the regulation of obscenity.
Id. at 306. Although the significance of Iowa's decision not to regulate the distribution
of obscene material may indeed be open to question, this does not justify the applica-
tion of unascertainable local standards to federal obscenity prosecutions when first
amendment rights are implicated.
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dards rather than local standards."'45 The application of state-
wide or districtwide standards to federal obscenity legislation
arguably would ease the chilling effect that obscenity statutes
have on speech, since distributors would not be required to
guess at a multitude of undefinable local standards.'46
Adoption of a statewide or districtwide standard has the
following additional advantages: (1) it avoids administrative
problems and encourages uniformity;"7 (2) it reduces litigation
since a judgment rendered under a statewide or districtwide
standard, rather than a local standard, would have broader
estoppel effect; 4 8 (3) it provides fair warning to the distributor
of the relevant community by which to gauge his conduct;'46
and (4) it makes appellate review more plausible. 150 Further-
more, if it is determined that the appropriate community is the
state or federal district, the courts could require that expert
testimony be required to prove the community standards, 5 '
thus reducing the possibility that jurors would impose their
own personal standards.
145. A Step Forward, supra note 43, at 796-97.
146. See Comment, Obscenity 1973, supra note 35, at 170.
147. See New Prosecutorial Techniques, supra note 43, at 205.
148. See Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems In Obscenity Regulation: A
Uniform Approach To Prior Restraints, Community Standards, and Judgment
Preclusion, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 543, 571 (1976) (excellent analysis of the estoppel
effect of obscenity judgments).
149. See A Step Forward, supra note 43, at 797.
150. See generally 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 442, 454 (1973).
151. See In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969). The court in Giannini applied statewide standards
to an indecent exposure prosecution and required the use of expert testimony to prove
the community standards. The court stated:
Relying principally on the well established doctrine that jurors should not
be endowed with the prerogative of imposing their own personal stan-
dards as the test of criminality of conduct, we hold that expert testimony
should be introduced to establish community standards . . . . To sanc-
tion convictions without expert evidence of community standards encour-
ages the jury to condemn as obscene such conduct or material as is per-
sonally distasteful or offensive to the particular juror.
Id. at 574-75, 446 P.2d at 543, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 663. However, after Giannini, the
legislature adopted California Penal Code § 312.1 which provides, in part, that
"neither the prosecution nor the defense shall be required to introduce expert witness
testimony concerning the obscene or harmful character of the matter or live conduct
which is the subject of any . . . prosecution" for violation of Chapter 7.5 (obscene
matter). CAL. PENAL CODE § 312.1 (West 1978). Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court decided Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973), which held that
expert testimony was not constitutionally required when the alleged obscene material
is placed into evidence.
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United States v. Peraino
A vague obscenity standard not only induces self-
censorship of protected materials among distributors but also
provides "for the 'self-appointed watch-guards' of the moral
fiber of our society a convenient justification for instigating
obscenity 'witch hunts,' harassing constitutionally protected
material in the process."' 52 In September, 1975, after a massive
four year federal investigation, a series of ten obscenity trials
was commenced in the Western District of Tennessee. Larry
Parrish, the assistant United States attorney and "self-
appointed watch-dog of the moral fiber," had indicted more
than sixty persons and corporations on the basic charge of
conspiracy to distribute obscene material in interstate com-
merce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465.153
In United States v. Peraino,154 one of the Memphis cases,
the jury held that the movie "Deep Throat" was obscene under
local community standards and that the film's male lead
(Harry Reems), its producers, and local distributors were guilty
of conspiracy to distribute an obscene film in interstate com-
merce.'55 Although Reems was granted a new trial and his con-
spiracy conviction was subsequently reversed, 58 use of the con-
spiracy doctrine in federal obscenity prosecutions poses a seri-
ous threat to the exercise of the constitutionally protected right
of free speech.'57
The federal conspiracy statute5 ' provides in pertinent
part:
152. Comment, Obscenity 1973, supra note 35, at 174.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (Supp. V 1976).
154. United States v. Peraino, CR 75-91 (W.D. Tenn. May 6, 1976).
155. Id.
156. Reems' motion for a new trial was granted "on grounds independent of the
conspiracy issue." Mayer & Mayer, New Approach To Obscenity - The Conspiracy
Doctrine, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 366 (1977).
157. For an excellent analysis and criticism of the use of the conspiracy doctrine
in federal obscenity prosecutions, see Mayer & Mayer, supra note 156.
158. 18 U.S.C. 371 (1976). Under the federal statute, "[tihe conspiracy is com-
plete on the forming of the criminal agreement, and the performance of at least one
overt act in furtherance thereof." Hall v. United States, 109 F.2d 976, 984 (10th Cir.
1940) (emphasis added); see Pinkerton v. United States, 151 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1945),
aff'd, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); Hunnicutt v. United States, 149 F.2d 888 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945). At common law, the conspiracy is complete when the
defendants enter into the proscribed agreement, and there is no requirement that
the prosecution prove in addition to the agreement an overt act pursuant to the agree-
ment. See, e.g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912); Deacon v. United
States, 124 F. 2d 352, 357-58 (1st Cir. 1941); United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp.
626, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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[I]f two or more persons conspire to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Although federal prosecutors have often combined a charge of
violation of the federal obscenity statutes with a charge of vio-
lation of the federal conspiracy statute,' 9 United States v.
Peraino marked the first time that an actor was convicted of
conspiracy to distribute an obscene film in interstate com-
merce.' ° Conceivably, the extension of the conspiracy charge
to actors, as well as authors, editors, cameramen, etc., who
were not involved with the selling, distribution or transporta-
tion of the material,'"' will further chill the exercise of first
amendment rights, when viewed in conjunction with
Hamling's local standards construction and the potential
abuses inherent in the conspiracy doctrine.' 2
For example, defendants charged with conspiracy to dis-
tribute obscene material in interstate commerce may be prose-
cuted in the district where the criminal agreement was formed
or in any district where any of the overt acts pursuant to the
agreement were committed.'13 This broad conspiracy venue
doctrine permits federal prosecutors to engage in the same in-
discriminate fori~m shopping that is available under section
1461, since criminal prosecutions may be commenced in any
district where an individual conspirator has committed any
overt act, regardless of the act's significance to the common
159. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Iowa 1965).
160. In United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Iowa 1965), "manage-
ment, personnel, editors, photographers and authors," who were not involved with
the sale or distribution of the alleged obscene material, were found guilty of conspiracy
to violate the obscenity statutes. Venue, supra note 117, at 371 & n.79.
161. In Peraino it was undisputed that "Reems' status in the production of the
film was that of a salaried employee.. . . Reems did not receive any profits from the
film, nor did he participate in the film's editing, distribution or promotion. It is of
particular note that Reems had no role in the shipment of the film in interstate
commerce or in the selection of locations in which the film was to be shown." Mayer
& Mayer, supra note 156, at 367 (footnote omitted).
162. See Venue, supra note 117, at 371-72; New Prosecutorial Techniques, supra
note 43, at 224; Mayer & Mayer, supra note 156, at 372-73.
For an excellent discussion of the general abuses and overbroad nature of the
conspiracy doctrine, see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-58 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF.
L. REv. 1137 (1973).
163. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 365-67 (1912).
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objective. Federal prosecutors are thus able to select among
forums where the obscene material has either been mailed or
where any individual conspirator has committed any overt act
in order to find the forum most favorable to the government.
Again, this in effect imposes the most conservative local ob-
scenity standard on the nation as a whole." 4
As a result, actors, authors, editors, cameramen, etc., who
are faced not only with the possibility of criminal prosecution
in a jurisdiction with a conservative obscenity standard, but
also with the burden of a trial in an inconvenient forum, 6' will
refrain from exercising their first amendment rights in order to
avoid potential prosecution.
The problems engendered by invoking the conspiracy doc-
trine in federal obscenity prosecutions are particularly acute
where there are multiple indictments and joint trials. In multi-
defendant cases the ability of the federal prosecutor to institute
criminal proceedings in a forum most favorable to the govern-
ment is greatly enhanced since the overt acts of all defendants
can be considered in making the venue determination.' 6 Fur-
thermore, joint trials primarily "serve the convenience of the
prosecutor and the court"'67 and may subject defendants to
serious abuse. For example, the following dangers are inherent
in any multidefendant conspiracy trial: (1) a defendant whose
participation was relatively minor may be compelled to endure
a rather lengthy trial at substantial expense and inconveni-
ence; '8 (2) a jury may overlook the duty to determine the suf-
ficiency of the evidence as to each defendant (i.e., guilt by
mere association);6 9 (3) a substantial amount of inadmissible
evidence against one defendant may be introduced against
others; 7 0 and (4) a co-defendant may assert a defense that is
antagonistic to that of another defendant.'7' Under this com-
bination of factors, it is evident that a multidefendant con-
164. See generally Mayer & Mayer, supra note 156, at 370-71.
165. The burdens and hardships imposed on a defendant by trial in a remote
district generally include the following: (1) interference with the defendant's business
activities and family responsibilities; (2) substantial travel and living expenses; (3)
representation by counsel in a strange and new community. See id. at 371.
166. See generally Johnson, supra note 162, at 1179.
167. Id. at 1172.
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1173.
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spiracy trial "poses an extreme threat to vital first amendment
rights." 7 2
Furthermore, a defendant whose joinder was initially pro-
per under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8'711 may find it
difficult to avoid such joinder under federal joinder law."' Al-
though a defendant at a joint trial may be faced with the dan-
gers previously mentioned,' such a defendant is not automati-
cally entitled to a severance under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 14.178 If the trial court, in its discretion, decides not
to grant the defendant's motion for a severance, the defendant
may be forced to utilize Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
21,11 which controls motions for change of venue.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21 (b) provides that
"[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the
interest of justice, the court upon motion of the defendant may
transfer the proceedings . . . to another district."'78 The rule,
which "interjects into criminal law an analogue to the civil
doctrine of forum non conveniens, "I's was promulgated to safe-
guard defendants from the physical and financial hardship of
prosecutions in remote districts.8 0 Although the government's
172. Mayer & Mayer, supra note 156, at 372.
173. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 provides in part:
(b) Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged
in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have partici-
pated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or
transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be
charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defen-
dants need not be charged in each count.
174. See Johnson, supra note 162, at 1173.
175. See notes 165 and notes 168-71 and accompanying text supra.
176. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides in part:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by
such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate
trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other
relief justice requires.
(emphasis added). However, in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court
held that the admission in evidence in a joint trial of a defendant's statement or
confession which implicates or incriminates co-defendants, yet is inadmissible against
these co-defendants by virtue of the hearsay rule, "violated . . . the co-defendants
right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment." Id. at 126.
177. FED. R. CaIM. P. 21.
178. Id.
179. United States v. McManus, 535 F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1052 (1977).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160, 175 (N.D. Iowa 1965).
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, there was no
venue transfer provision.
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choice of venue is ordinarily presumed to be proper, the courts
have discretionary power to transfer cases under the rule.'
Rule 21 (b), however, cannot remedy the chilling effect
produced by the application of local standards and the conspir-
acy doctrine to federal obscenity prosecutions brought in the
districts where the allegedly obscene materials were distrib-
uted. Federal courts have consistently refused to transfer ob-
scenity prosecutions under Rule 21 (b) which were brought in
the district where the alleged obscene material was distrib-
uted.' 2 For example, in United States v. Elkins,8 3 the defen-
dants were indicted for mailing alleged obscene movies from
California to Iowa.'84 Chief Judge Edward J. McManus of the
Northern District of Iowa granted the defendants' motion for
change of venue pursuant to Rule 21 (b) and the case was
transferred to the Central District of California.' 8 The Califor-
nia District Court dismissed the indictment since the jury
could not determine the contemporary community standards
of the Northern District of Iowa, which were applicable under
the guidelines established by Hamling. " The defendants were
subsequently reindicted in the Northern District of Iowa, on
essentially the same charges as in the previous indictment.'87
Judge McManus once again granted the defendants' motion for
change of venue.' The government petitioned the court of
appeals for a writ of mandamus, asserting that the district
court erred in granting the motion for change of venue.' 8 The
court of appeals in United States v. McManus' ° held that the
trial court's transfer of the case to the defendants' district of
residence was an abuse of discretion since Hamling mandated
that obscenity vel non must be determined according to local
181. United States v. McManus, 535 F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied
429 U.S. 1052 (1977).
182. See, e.g., United States v. McManus, 535 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160, 173 (N.D. Iowa
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 956 (1965); United States v. West Coast News, 216 F.
Supp. 911, 926 (W.D. Mich. 1963).
183. United States v. Elkins, No. CR 74-4015 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
184. United States v. McManus, 535 F.2d 460, 461-62 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977).
185. Id. at 462.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. United States v. McManus, 535 F.2d 460 (8th Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1052 (1977).
[Vol. 18
1978] OBSCENITY PROSECUTIONS
community standards. 9' The Court concluded that the govern-
ment's choice of forum in postal obscenity cases must not be
disturbed unless the defendant has introduced strong evidence
of "intentional overreaching" by the government. 9 ' The amel-
iorating effect of Rule 21 (b) in postal obscenity prosecutions
is thus largely illusory.
In sum, applying the conspiracy doctrine to federal ob-
scenity prosecutions "appears particularly ominous in view of
the chilling effect such prosecutions have upon free expres-
sion."' 3 Under a charge of conspiracy to violate the federal
191. Id. at 461, 464. In McManus, the court's refusal to transfer the case was
largely influenced by their reading of the legislative history of § 1461, particularly the
1958 venue amendments, which indicated Congress' intent to allow the district to
which the alleged obscene material was mailed to institute the criminal prosecution.
535 F.2d at 463. However, the court was quick to add that:
[iun addition to the specific intent demonstrated by Congress to allow
the recipient district to prosecute, we are faced with the fact that by its
decisions in Hamling and Miller, the Supreme Court has determined that
one of the constitutional standards used to determine obscenity is local
rather than national in character. This requirement, coupled with the
decision of the government to bring this indictment in Iowa, mandates
that the obscenity vel non of these materials must be determined accord-
ing to the Iowa contemporary community standards.
Id. at 464.
Whether federal courts would refuse to transfer prosecutions for conspiracy to
violate the obscenity statutes under Rule 21(b) which were brought in a district where
only an overt act in furtherance of the criminal agreement has been committed has
not yet been answered. Although the legislative history of § 1461 played an important
part in the court's consideration and districts where only an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy has been committed have not been harmed by the receipt of allegedly
obscene materials, the court's statement in McManus that the local standards of the
district where the prosecution is brought must be applied under Hamling seems to
mandate the use of the local standards of the district where the conspiracy prosecution
is brought, even though the alleged obscene material was never mailed into that dis-
trict. For an interesting analysis of the conflict of law problems posed by the applica-
tion of local standards and the conspiracy doctrine to federal obscenity prosecutions,
see Schauer, supra note 99, at 399-400.
192. 535 F.2d at 464. However, in a multidefendant prosecution for conspiracy
to violate the obscenity laws, where the local standards of the district in which the
conspiracy prosecution is brought must apparently be applied even though the alleg-
edly obscene materials were never mailed into that district, a distributor may be held
to "the standards of a community that are not relevant to his actions," since the scope
of the conspiracy for that particular co-conspirator may not have encompassed the
district where the conspiracy prosecution was brought. Schauer, supra note 99, at 400.
As a result, when a conspiracy prosecution is brought in a district where only an overt
act in furtherance of the criminal agreement was committed and no material was
actually distributed in that district, a co-conspirator may justifiably claim that the
federal government has intentionally overreached the boundaries of proper jurisdiction
and thereby overcome the government's choice of forum. A prosecution for conspiracy
to distribute obscene materials nationwide is arguably unjustifiable since the material
may or may not be legally obscene depending on where it is distributed.
193. Mayer & Mayer, supra note 156, at 372.
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obscenity statutes, actors, authors, cameramen, producers,
etc., can be prosecuted for the distribution of obscene material
in a jurisdiction with a conservative obscenity standard, even
though they were not involved with the material's distribution
and the material was never shipped into that jurisdiction. The
application of the conspiracy doctrine to federal obscenity
prosecutions compounds the constitutional infirmities inherent
in Ham ling's local standards construction and makes the need
for reassessment of that opinion all the more pressing.
CONCLUSION
It is now well established that the power vested in Con-
gress to establish post offices and to regulate the entire postal
system of the nation may be constitutionally exercised to ex-
clude objectionable matter from the United States mails. It is
likewise well established that obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press. However, as
stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, "the postal power . . . is sub-
ject to the limitations of the Bill of Rights . . . .Congress may
not through its postal police power put limitations upon the
freedom of the press which if directly attempted would be un-
constitutional."'' 4 The application of local standards and the
continuing offense doctrine of section 3237 to the postal obscen-
ity statutes arguably transgresses first amendment rights; the
distributor is induced to engage in "debilitating" self-
censorship and the public is denied access to sexually oriented
materials.
The Court's local standards construction in Hamling has
essentially backfired. Since distributors can be prosecuted in
districts with the least tolerant obscenity standards, the effect
has been to establish on a national level conservative locally
derived rules concerning what material can be distributed. Al-
though a national standard may be viewed as an illusory con-
cept, the Constitution mandates that a national standard be
applied to federal obscenity prosecutions to adequately safe-
guard the first amendment rights of the distributor and the
public.
Randolph S. Hicks
194. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 430-31 (1921).
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